



















































































































































































































Do market economies allocate risk efficiently?  If not, what
government policies can improve the allocation of risk?  These are
classic questions of economic theory.  One celebrated answer comes
from the Arrow-Debreu theory of general equilibrium.  This theory
teaches that under certain conditions--in particular, if
contingent-claims markets are complete--the allocation of risk will
be Pareto efficient.  In other words, with complete markets,
society can let the invisible hand allocate risk.
This paper explores a deviation from Arrow-Debreu theory that
arises from a simple fact that not everyone is born at the
beginning of time.  In an overlapping-generations economy, markets
must be incomplete, because a person cannot engage in risk-sharing
trades with those who are not yet born. The risks associated with
holding capital assets, for instance, can be shared with others
alive at the same time, but they cannot be shared with future
generations.  As a result, the allocation of risk need not be
efficient, and government policy may be able to make Pareto
improvements.
The suboptimality of risk allocation in stochastic
overlapping-generations models has been discussed in several recent
papers, including Bohn (1998), Shiller (1999), Rangel and
Zeckhauser (1998), and Smetters (2000).  We approach this issue by
considering a simple thought experiment. Imagine that all2
generations ever to be born were here today and able to trade in
complete contingent-claims markets.  How would the allocation of
risk in this complete-markets setting differ from the one the
economy reaches without these prenatal risk-sharing trades?
This approach builds on two traditions.  The first is the
Arrow-Debreu theory of general equilibrium.  In essence, our
thought experiment opens up all markets that are assumed to exist
in Arrow-Debreu theory but, in fact, cannot exist in an
overlapping-generations economy.  The second tradition is the
Rawlsian approach to social justice.  Our thought experiment
envisions a hypothetical time period when all generations are alive
in an "original position" behind a "veil of ignorance." In Rawls's
(1971) work on social insurance, the ignorance concerns cross-
sectional uncertainty about one's station in life.  Here, the
ignorance concerns time-series uncertainty about whether one is
born into a lucky or unlucky generation.
  This theoretical investigation is motivated by  practical
issues of public policy. The government influences the allocation
of risk among generations in many ways, most notably through the
social security system.  A benevolent policymaker might try to use
these instruments to achieve the allocation of risk that the
invisible hand would reach if it could. That is, the policymaker
might try to implement the outcome that people would achieve on
their own if, as in our thought experiment, they were able to fully3
trade risks.  Our goal, therefore, is not only to examine how
different the world would be with complete markets but also to
discuss how, without such markets, government policy might
substitute for them.  This analysis sheds light, for instance, on
how the social security trust fund should be invested and how taxes
and benefits should respond to macroeconomic shocks.
We proceed as follows.  Section II presents a stochastic
overlapping-generations model that we use in our main analysis.  To
keep things simple, we assume a single source of risk: uncertainty
about the return on capital.  We begin by describing the
equilibrium in which people can trade only with others alive at the
same time, so each generation bears the entire risk realized during
its lifetime.  We call this the Hobbesian equilibrium, because it
is the equilibrium that nature gives us (and because a person's
involvement in the market economy is "nasty, brutish, and short.")
     In Section III, we introduce the central thought experiment of
the paper.  Maintaining the overlapping-generations framework of
Section II, we posit the existence of complete contingent claims
markets--markets for the consumption good in each period in every
possible history.  The individuals who will make up all generations
participate in these markets in an "original position" that exists
before the beginning of time.  We call the allocation of
consumption determined in the original position the Rawlsian
equilibrium.4
     Sections IV and V solve for the Rawlsian equilibrium in the
model.  In general, one cannot obtain an analytic solution, so we
simplify the problem in alternative ways.  In Section IV we
consider a special case in which only a single generation faces
uncertainty in capital returns, and examine how this risk is shared
with other generations.  In Section V we consider the more general
case in which every generation faces uncertainty.  We derive an
approximate solution that is valid when the shocks are small.  
The solution we find in Section V takes a simple and intuitive
form.  We find that capital-return risk in each period is shared
equally among the generations alive during that period and all
subsequent generations.  In contrast to the Hobbesian equilibrium,
where consumption is serially uncorrelated from generation to
generation, consumption in the Rawlsian equilibrium follows a
random walk.  
We also draw a connection in Section V between our problem and
the well-known Ramsey social planning problem.  The Rawlsian
outcome we examine is determined by decentralized trading among an
infinite number of generations.  Nonetheless, the resulting path of
consumption is the same as would be chosen by a Ramsey social
planner with a particular discount rate on future generations'
utility.  Thus, the Rawlsian approach to generational risk offers
a rationale for studying Ramsey optima.
We next move closer to issues of policy.  Because it is not5
yet feasible to transport people back in time to an original
position, free markets are not a practical way to share
intergenerational risks.  In Section VI, we ask whether government
policies can substitute for the missing markets and ensure the
Rawlsian allocation.  We find a simple policy that does so: a
fully-funded social security system in which the system's trust
fund holds equity.  In this system, benefits are permanently
adjusted in response to shocks to equity returns to keep the system
solvent.  
There is, however, more than one way for policy to achieve any
given allocation of risk.  Policymakers can also implement the
Rawlsian equilibrium if the social security trust fund holds safe
debt.  Yet in this system, benefits must be adjusted in what, at
first glance, may seem a surprising way: they must be negatively
indexed to equity returns.
     Section VII sketches extensions of our basic model, including
one in which both wage growth and capital returns are uncertain.
Here, the Rawlsian equilibrium shares both kinds of uncertainty
across generations, and this allocation can again be implemented
with an equity-based social security system.  
Section VIII concludes.
II. The Model and the Hobbesian Equilibrium
     This section describes the basic version of our overlapping-6
generations model, which we keep as simple as possible to build
intuition.  A fixed number of people is born each period, and
everyone lives for two periods.  When young, a person supplies
labor inelastically and receives a fixed wage, which we normalize
to one.  Each person consumes only when he is old.  Thus a worker
saves his entire wage when he is young and consumes the return on
this saving, including the principal, when he is old.  There are no
bequests.  We assume log utility over consumption; thus lifetime
utility for an individual born at period t is
(1) Ut  =  log(ct+1),
where ct+1 is the individual's consumption in period t+1, when he is
old. 
Our assumption that only the old consume simplifies the model
by eliminating the intertemporal consumption decision of the young,
which is not essential to the issue of intergenerational risk-
sharing.  In Section VII, we discuss a more general model in which
individuals consume in both periods of life.
     We let Rt denote the gross return on savings between periods
t-1 and t.  Because the generation born at t receives a wage of one
and saves it all, its consumption at t+1 is Rt+1.  We take the
return Rt to be an exogenous random variable.  These assumptions
about factor returns could be justified by positing a linear
technology for output: Y = L + RK.
We assume that Rt is distributed independently over time and7
has a two-point distribution.   Let  be the average value of the
interest rate.  Rt equals +xt with probability one half and -xt
with probability one half.  xt measures the degree of dispersion in
the capital return in period t.  It is natural to focus on the case
in which xt is the same for all t (and we will do so below), but it
will prove useful to have in hand the general case in which xt
varies across periods.  We assume that the lowest possible return,
-xt, is greater than one; this assures that the model satisfies
Abel et. al's (1989) condition for dynamic efficiency in Diamond's
(1965) sense.
     As a benchmark, we begin by considering the equilibrium of
this model without any intergenerational risk sharing.  This
equilibrium is assumed in most previous work on stochastic
overlapping-generations models. It is based on the realistic
assumption that people can trade only with others who are alive at
the same time.  We also make the standard assumption that the young
enter the market after the current return on savings is realized;
thus there is no remaining uncertainty within a period for the old
and young to share.  As noted above, we call this outcome the
Hobbesian equilibrium.
     Given the environment just described, the Hobbesian
equilibrium is trivial to derive.  The generation born at t saves
its wage and consumes its wealth when old.  Thus, ct+1=Rt+1 and
Ut=log(Rt+1).  Because Rt+1 is random and uncorrelated over time, each8
generation bears all of a single idiosyncratic risk--the return
risk in the period it happens to be old.  Note that consumption is
independently distributed from generation to generation.
This Hobbesian equilibrium is clearly inefficient.  There
would be gains if the old at period t+1 could share the risk it
faces with the generations born at t+1 and later.  However, by the
time these generations are born and ready to participate in
markets, the outcome for period t+1 is already realized, and
private improvements in risk allocation are no longer possible.
III. The Rawlsian Equilibrium
     We now consider a hypothetical world with markets for
intergenerational risk-sharing.  We assume that all generations are
placed in an "original position" that exists before period one,
when the first generation is born.  In this original position, each
person knows when he will be born, but he does not know the future
evolution of the economy; in particular, he does not know whether
his generation will be lucky or unlucky in its realization of
capital returns.  In the original position, everyone can share the
risks they face by participating in contingent-claims markets.
     We use the following terminology.  The "state" in period t is
the realization of R in that period.  Because there are two
possible realizations of R, there are two possible states in each
period.  A "history" of the economy through period t is a sequence9
of states for periods 1,...,t.  There are 2t possible histories of
the economy through period t, which we index by h=1,...,2t.
     We assume that the markets in the original position are
complete in the sense that there is a market for the consumption
good in each period and each possible history of the economy
through that period.  We index consumption at period t in history
h by th.  For each period t, there are 2t markets for history-
contingent consumption.
     A person born in period t receives a wage of one in all
histories of the economy through t.  Thus, his endowment is one
unit of good th for all h=1,...,2t.  He can sell part of this
endowment and use the proceeds to buy conditional consumption goods
at t+1.  He can also save and thereby transform goods dated at t
into goods dated at t+1.  For each unit of good th that he saves,
he receives units of goods (t+1)h' for each history h' through t+1
that is a continuation of history h.  There are two such histories:
the saver receives +xt+1 of the good in one history and -xt+1 in
the other.  Given these possibilities, an agent chooses a basket of
goods dated at t+1 to maximize the expected value of utility,
log(ct+1). 
     A Walrasian auctioneer finds the price that equilibrates
supply and demand in each market for history-contingent
consumption.  We are interested in the set of equilibrium prices
and the resulting allocation of consumption in all possible10
histories of the economy.
     Obviously, this is a hard problem, and we have been unable to
find a general analytical solution.  Therefore, we simplify the
problem in two different ways in the next two sections.  In Section
IV, we assume that capital returns are uncertain in only a single
period; thus there is only one shock.  In Section V, we return to
the general case of many shocks but solve the model using a first-
order approximation.  Thus, we derive a solution that is valid when
the shocks to capital returns are small.  Each of these two special
cases yields its own insights into the nature of the Rawlsian
equilibrium.  
IV. The Case of a Single Shock
The original position we have described includes many markets
for sharing risks.  In this section, we consider a special case in
which only one generation faces uncertainty.  In this example, the
uncertainty concerns the capital return in period j for the
generation born at j-1.  In the notation introduced above, xj>0 and
xt=0 for all t= /j.  This example helps develop intuition about the
model, and it is a building block for the more general analysis
below.
     A. Solution for the Rawlsian Equilibrium
     In this example, the possible histories of the economy
collapse to a simple set.  In period j, there are two possible11
states of the economy: the good state (G) in which Rj=+xj and the
bad state (B) in which Rj=-xj.  R= in all other periods.  There
is only one possible history of the economy through t for t<j, and
two possible histories through tj: the history with state G at j
and the history with state B at j.  Thus there is only one market
for consumption in each period t<j, and two markets for each period
tj.  We index the goods in the various markets by t for t<j and
by ti, i=G and i=B, for tj.
     The Appendix describes in detail the solution for the Rawlsian
equilibrium.  Here, we sketch the approach and results.
The starting point is the budget constraints and objective
functions of individuals in the original position.  Using these, we
solve for history-contingent consumption demand as a function of
the relative prices of contingent consumption goods and then for
the equilibrium relative prices.  In equilibrium, there is no trade
in goods dated before j, when the shock occurs.  The only motive
for trade is to share the risk from the shock, and goods before j
cannot be contingent on the shock.  The key prices are those for
contingent goods dated j and later; we denote these prices by PtG
and PtB.  The Appendix shows that equilibrium relative prices
satisfy
(2) Pti/P(t+1)i =    for i = G, B; 
(3) PtB/PtG = Q  [2 + (-1)xj]/[2 - (-1)xj].
These equations fully describe the path of equilibrium relative12
prices.
     These equilibrium conditions are simple to interpret.
Condition (2) concerns the prices of the good in different periods
but the same realization of history.  It is a no-arbitrage
condition.  In this economy, people trade consumption between t and
t+1 both by saving and by participating in markets.  In
equilibrium, the two activities must yield the same return.  
     Condition (3) gives the relative price of consumption in the
good and bad histories.  This price is the same for all periods
tj; this follows from a no-arbitrage condition and the fact that
agents can trade across periods at a fixed rate.  The key result is
that Q>1: it costs more than a unit of consumption in the good
history to buy a unit in the bad history.  This is necessary to
induce agents to demand greater consumption in the good history,
when more resources for consumption are available. 
     The Appendix also derives equilibrium consumption of each
generation.  For generations born before j-1, consumption in the
Rawlsian equilibrium is the same as in the Hobbesian equilibrium.
For the generation born at j-1 (the one that experiences the
shock), consumption when old is given by
 (4)     cjG  =  [(1+Q) + (1-Q)xj]/2
         cjB  =  [(1+Q) + (1-Q)xj]/2Q .
For all generations born at j and later, consumption in the
Rawlsian equilibrium is13
 (5)     ctG = (1+Q)/2;
         ctB = (1+Q)/2Q,  tj+1.
Equations (2) though (5) fully describe the Rawlsian equilibrium.
     B. Discussion of the Rawlsian Equilibrium
     The solution we have just described has two notable
properties.  First, the ratio of consumption in the good and bad
histories is equal to Q>1 for all generations born at j-1 and
later.  All these generations--those who are old when the shock
occurs and those who come later--suffer the same proportional loss
in consumption from a bad shock.  In other words, the risk from the
shock is spread equally across generations.  
This contrasts sharply with the Hobbesian equilibrium.  In
that equilibrium, the return risk in period j affects only the old
in that period.  The ratio of consumption by the old in period j in
the two histories is (+xj)/(-xj), which is greater than Q.  Thus,
this generation reduces its risk by moving from the Hobbesian
equilibrium to the Rawlsian equilibrium, where it can share risk
with future generations.  
     The second notable result concerns average consumption in the
Hobbesian and Rawlsian equilibria.  For generations born at j and
later, average consumption over the good and bad histories is
[(1+Q)2/4Q].  This exceeds , which is these generations'
consumption in the Hobbesian equilibrium.  Thus, average
consumption is higher in the Rawlsian equilibrium than in the14
Hobbesian equilibrium for all these generations.  A bit more
algebra shows that for the generation born at j-1, average
consumption is lower in the Rawlsian equilibrium.  Of course, for
all generations, utility must be higher in the Rawlsian
equilibrium, for the Hobbesian allocation is still feasible.
     These results have a simple interpretation.  In the Hobbesian
equilibrium, the generation born at j-1 is uniquely disadvantaged:
it is the only generation facing return uncertainty.  In the
original position, it reduces this uncertainty through the
contingent-claims markets.  In essence, it buys insurance from
later generations.  But later generations are willing to sell
insurance only if they are compensated for taking on the risk.
This compensation is reflected in a value of Q greater than one.
As a result, later generations obtain more consumption in the good
history than they give up in the bad history.
V. The Case of Many Small Shocks
     Having explored the special case of a single shock, we now
examine a more general case in which there are shocks in every
period: xt is positive for all t.  In the original position, there
are now 2t markets for history-contingent consumption in period t.
These markets yield rich opportunities for sharing risks among
generations.
     A. Solution for the Rawlsian Equilibrium15
     We are interested in solving for equilibrium consumption in
all possible histories, of which there are 2t through period t.  We
simplify this hard problem by using a first-order approximation
that is valid as long as the shocks, xt, are small.  That is, we
derive the Rawlsian equilibrium when there are small fluctuations
in capital returns.
     The advantage of using a first-order approximation is that it
eliminates any possible interaction among the shocks in different
periods.  (This is shown formally in the Appendix.)  Thus, we can
use the results in the previous section to show the effect of any
individual shock, and we can find the effect of a series of shocks
by summing the effects of the shocks.
     Consider, then, a shock in period j.  Equations (3)-(5) show
consumption for period j and after.  Substituting the expression
for Q in equation (3) into equations (4)-(5) yields consumption in
terms of the size of the shock, xj, and the average return .
Taking a first-order approximation in xj around xj=0 yields
(6) ctG  =   + [(-1)/]xj;
ctB  =   - [(-1)/]xj.
(If you really want to see the details, go to the Appendix.)
     According to equation (6), the shock to the capital return
causes consumption to rise or fall by a fraction (-1)/ of the
shock for each generation born at j-1 and later.  Note there is no
distinction here between the generation born at j-1, who lives16
through the shock, and later generations.  They share the risk
equally and in an actuarially fair way, so that all generations
have the same average consumption.  The previous result that later
generations have higher average consumption no longer holds,
because the relative price of consumption in the good and bad
histories approaches one as the shock becomes small.  That is, the
compensation future generations demand to take on risk is second-
order, so it vanishes as the shock becomes small.
While equation (6) shows how consumption responds to a single,
small shock, the result for a series of small shocks is found by
summing the effects of each shock.  To express equilibrium in a
particular history, we let t be an indicator variable equal to one
in the good state and minus one in the bad state.  The history of
the economy through t is given by the sequence {1, 2,...., t}.
In any history, consumption in the Rawlsian equilibrium is given by
t
(7)      ct  =   +  j[(-1)/]xj.
j=1
If the shocks are all the same size (xj=x for all j), then this
expression reduces to




t is the number of periods through t with good realizations
of the shock and NB
t is the number with bad realizations.  A
generation's consumption is raised by a fixed amount for every good
shock in the past and reduced by the same amount for every bad17
shock.
     Note that the last equation implies
(9) ct - ct-1 =  t[(-1)/]x .
In each period, the change in consumption is proportional to the
current shock.  Thus, even though consumption in the Hobbesian
equilibrium was serially uncorrelated, consumption in the Rawlsian
equilibrium follows a random walk.  The reason is that full risk-
sharing causes each shock to be spread equally over current and
future generations.  Rather than a shock affecting only the
generation living through it, it affects later generations as well.
Intergenerational risk sharing makes the impact of a shock both
smaller and more persistent.
     B. Rawls Meets Ramsey
     Our random-walk result for Rawlsian consumption may seem
familiar: it resembles Hall's (1978) result for the optimal plan
for a single, infinite-horizon Ramsey consumer under uncertainty.
The resemblance is not a coincidence.  Any Pareto-efficient
equilibrium solves a social planner's problem for some set of
weights on the welfare of different agents.  In our model, the
Rawlsian equilibrium solves a planner's problem for maximizing a
weighted average of the utility of different generations.  For this
planner's problem to become the Ramsey model, the only missing
ingredient is for the weights to decline exponentially over time.
     One can show the weights do in fact decline exponentially with18
the discount factor =1/.  The following is a sketch of the proof.
Consider an infinite-horizon social planning problem with log
utility, a gross interest rate , and an arbitrary discount factor
(t) for discounting utility between periods t and t+1.  Under
certainty, consumption grows between t and t+1 at a rate (t).
With small shocks, certainty-equivalence holds, and expected
consumption growth equals (t).  In our solution for the Rawlsian
equilibrium, however, consumption is expected to remain constant.
Thus, the discount factor must be the constant =1/.  This
establishes that the social planning problem associated with the
Rawlsian equilibrium is the Ramsey problem with this particular
discount factor.
     This correspondence between the Rawlsian equilibrium and the
Ramsey model is noteworthy.  Economists often use Ramsey problems
when studying the allocation of consumption over time. One
justification for this approach is Barro's (1974) model, where the
discount factor measures the extent of altruism among generations.
The Rawlsian equilibrium, however, suggests a different
rationale for studying the Ramsey problem and a different
interpretation of the discount factor.  In our environment, to
replicate the Rawlsian equilibrium, the social planner has to
distribute risk optimally but not pursue deterministic transfers
across generations.  If the discount factor  were not equal to
1/, the planner would want to move resources from earlier to later19
generations, or vice versa.  When the discount factor  is exactly
1/, the planner's only remaining goal is to allocate risk
efficiently.  Thus, only this discount factor replicates the
equilibrium that generations would choose on their own in the
original position.  In this way, the Rawlsian equilibrium pins down
the discount rate in the Ramsey model without invoking
intergenerational altruism.
VI. Implications for the Design of Social Security
     So far, we have considered how optimal intergenerational risk
sharing, as modeled by complete contingent-claims markets, affects
the allocation of resources.  We now move closer to issues of
policy and consider what institutions might support this optimal
allocation. The natural institution to consider is social security,
because it takes resources from some generations and gives
resources to others, which is what is needed to share generational
risk.  But how should we design a social security system if our
goal is to implement the allocation of resources in the Rawlsian
equilibrium?
     The first result concerning social security design follows
naturally from the results we have already seen:
Proposition 1: Without government intervention, the economy cannot
reach the optimal allocation of risk across generations.20
Similarly, a social security system that relies completely on
private accounts also fails to allocate risk optimally.
The first part of the proposition states that the Hobbesian
equilibrium is not the same as the Rawlsian equilibrium, which we
established in the preceding sections. The second part of the
proposition follows for the same reason.  In this model, a social
security system with private individual retirement accounts does
not move the allocation of risk away from the Hobbesian
equilibrium: each generation still bears the full risk of shocks to
the capital return rather than sharing the risk with other
generations.  Similar results about the sub-optimality of the
equilibrium without intervention are presented by authors such as
Bohn (1998) and Rangel and Zeckhauser (1998).
     Although it is easy to see that a privatized social security
system does not implement the Rawlsian equilibrium, it is less
obvious how to describe policies that do.  In overlapping-
generations models, the government can often achieve the same
allocation of resources in several equivalent ways.  For example,
a tax or transfer can occur when a person is young or old; with
appropriate discounting, this does not matter for the resulting
allocation of consumption.  For concreteness and realism, we focus
on policies that resemble social security systems: the young pay
taxes based on their wages, and the old receive transfers.  We21
examine two ways to implement the Rawlsian equilibrium, as
expressed in equation (8).
The first is described in this proposition:
Proposition 2: The government can implement the Rawlsian
equilibrium using a fully-funded social security system with a
trust fund invested in equity claims to capital.  The social
security benefit responds positively to the capital return, and it
follows a random walk.
The proof is straightforward.  In essence, the government here
takes over the economy and enforces the Rawlsian allocation.  It
taxes 100 percent of wages (recall that there is no first-period
consumption), invests the tax revenue in capital, and then pays out
a benefit determined by equation (8).  Providing a social security
benefit equal to consumption in the Rawlsian equilibrium ensures
that the system replicates that equilibrium.  This system is
feasible because the Rawlsian equilibrium is feasible.
This social security system may seem remote from real-world
policy, but there is another, more natural way to describe this
system.  The tax rate is constant, the system is fully-funded and
invested in equity, and the benefit rises or falls as the economy
realizes shocks.  In each period, the benefit is based on the
system's "permanent income."  That is, the benefit is set at a22
level that could remain constant if there were no more shocks.
Seen in this light, the system resembles some proposals for social
security reform, which often involve adjusting benefits in response
to changes in the system's expected resources.
     In the system just described, the social security trust fund
must be invested in equity claims to capital.  There is, however,
another way to reach the Rawlsian allocation that does not require
the trust fund to hold equity claims:
Proposition 3: The government can implement the Rawlsian
equilibrium using a fully-funded social security system invested in
riskless bonds.  In this system, the benefits received by the old
are negatively indexed to the current return to capital.
To establish this proposition, imagine we were in a world
described by Proposition 2, where the trust fund is invested in
equity claims to capital.  Then suppose the government makes three
changes.  First, it sells its equity claims to the private sector.
Second, it uses the proceeds from that sale to buy riskless debt
from the private sector.  Third, it adjusts the social security
benefit to insure the private sector against the uncertainty
inherent in holding the equity claims.  Meanwhile, the private
sector engages in the opposite transaction: it buys the equity
claims with the proceeds from its debt sale. 23
In this new system, the social security benefit is consumption
in the Rawlsian equilibrium, as determined in equation (8), minus
tx.  This last term represents the negative indexation: it offsets
the gain or loss that the private sector experiences from issuing
riskless bonds and buying risky capital.  (Note that under our
small-shock assumption, riskless bonds pay , while risky capital
earns  +tx.)  This scheme reaches the same allocation of
consumption and risk as in Proposition 2--the Rawlsian allocation.
But the asset allocation has changed: risky capital is now held in
the private sector, rather than by the government.  
     The message of Propositions 2 and 3 can be summarized as
follows.  In the Hobbesian equilibrium, capital risk in any period
falls entirely on the generation that is old in that period.  To
move toward the Rawlsian equilibrium, a social security system has
to share that risk with future generations.  There are two ways to
do this.  The social security system can hold the economy's capital
stock and the risks associated with it.  Or the social security
system can insure generations for the capital risk they bear
through negative indexation.
VII. Two Extensions
     This section considers two ways to generalize our model.
First, we allow wages as well as capital returns to be uncertain.
Second, we assume that agents consume in both periods of their24
lives.  The derivations parallel those for our basic model, so we
only sketch the analysis.
     A. Wage-Growth Uncertainty
     In reality, wages as well as capital returns are uncertain.
A generation can suffer bad luck in the form of low wage growth,
such as the productivity slowdown from 1974 to 1996.  Here we
examine intergenerational risk-sharing in the presence of wage as
well as asset-return uncertainty.
      Let Wt denote the wage in period t and Ht=Wt/Wt-1 denote the
gross growth rate of the wage. H represents the growth in the value
of the human capital with which a person is endowed at birth.  As
a first step toward realism, we allow the mean of H, which we call
, to be greater than one.  Paralleling our assumption about R, we
assume that Ht has a two-point distribution: Ht equals +zt with
probability one half and -zt with probability one half, where zt
is a positive constant.  Wage-growth Ht is serially uncorrelated,
so the level of the wage follows a random walk with drift; this
seems realistic as a first approximation.  We assume +zt < -xt,
which assures dynamic efficiency in Diamond's sense.  We make no
assumption about the contemporaneous correlation of Ht and Rt.
     In this version of the model, the consumption of generation t
when old is WtRt+1 in the Hobbesian equilibrium.  It is the product
of a random-walk variable (the wage) and a serially uncorrelated
variable (the return to capital).  Because there are two possible25
realizations of Rt and two of Ht, there are a total of four possible
states each period.  This means there are 4t possible histories of
the economy through period t.  In the original position, there is
a market for consumption in each period in each of these histories.
     The analysis of this model parallels the previous discussion.
One can first solve the model for the case of a wage-growth shock
in a single period to see how the risk from this shock is shared
among generations.  One can then derive a first-order approximation
to the general case of wage-growth and capital-return shocks in
each period.  If uncertainty is constant over time (that is, if
xt=x and zt=z for all t), then the approximate solution for
consumption in the Rawlsian equilibrium is











G is the number of periods in which the realization of the
R-shock is good and the other N's are defined similarly.
      To interpret this expression, note that t would be the
consumption of generation t when old if wage growth and the capital
return were always equal to their means of  and .  Shocks to R
and H cause random-walk movements in consumption relative to this
baseline.  Each shock to the capital return permanently raises or
lowers consumption by a fraction x(-)/2; each shock to wage
growth raises or lowers consumption by a fraction z(1/).
Consumption follows a random walk, with the innovation in each
period depending on both of the shocks.  Generalizing another26
earlier result, we can show that this consumption behavior is the
same as would be chosen by a Ramsey social planner with discount
factor /.  
As in our earlier analysis, moving from the Hobbesian to the
Rawlsian equilibrium reduces the impact of shocks on the
generations who receive them.  In the Hobbesian equilibrium, a
positive shock to the capital return at t raises the consumption of
the old at t by a fraction x/. In the Rawlsian equilibrium, the
effect is x(-)/2, which is a fraction (-)/<1 of the effect in
the Hobbesian equilibrium.  Similarly, a positive wage shock raises
the consumption of the generation that receives it by z/ in the
Hobbesian equilibrium, and z/ in the Rawlsian equilibrium; the
latter is a fraction /<1 of the former.
In the complete markets of the original position, the two
kinds of risk are shared differently.  As before, a generation that
receives a capital-return shock shares the risk with future
generations.  However, the original position does not create
opportunities to share wage-growth risk with future generations.
Because the wage follows a random walk, a wage-growth shock at t
already has a proportional effect on all generations born at t and
later in the Hobbesian equilibrium, leaving no room for additional
risk-sharing.  There is, however, an opportunity to share the risk
from a wage-growth shock at t with the generation that is old
during that period.  In the Hobbesian equilibrium, this generation27
is unaffected by the shock, because its wage was determined in the
previous period.  By contrast, in the Rawlsian equilibrium, a wage-
growth shock at t affects the consumption of the old at t; this
allows a smaller effect on the young at t and all later
generations.
       The addition of wage uncertainty has little effect on the
nature of the social security systems that implement the Rawlsian
equilibrium.  Propositions 1-3 of the previous section still hold.
The only difference is that both shocks affect the system's
resources and hence cause random-walk movements in the level of
social security benefits.
     B. Consumption in Both Periods of Life
We now relax the assumption that individuals consume only when
old.  In particular, we assume that an individual born in period t
receives utility of 





t are the consumption of the young and the old in
period t.  Our earlier model is the special case in which =0.
Once again, the Hobbesian equilibrium is simple to derive.
The assumption of log utility leads to the result that an agent
saves a fraction 1- of his wage.  Consumption when young is Wt,
and consumption when old is (1-)WtRt+1.
     To derive the Rawlsian equilibrium, we continue to assume that
there are two possible values of Rt and two possible values of Ht28
for each t.  Thus, there are again 4t history-contingent
consumption goods for each t.  In this case, however, an agent born
at t consumes goods dated at both t and t+1.  
At an intuitive level, it is easy to see the Rawlsian
equilibrium that arises in this setting.  Each agent smooths
consumption over the two periods of his life; thus, a shock at t
has the same proportional effect on cy and co for all generations
born at t and later.  Along with this smoothing across periods for
each generation, we have the same smoothing across generations as
before using the complete contingent-claims markets. 
One detail is that a shock to wage growth or the capital
return in period t affects both cy and co for generations born at
t and later but affects only co for the generation born at t-1,
because cy
t-1 is determined before period t.  The Appendix gives
formulas for cy
t and co
t.  The key qualitative features are that the
ratio of cy
t to co
t is a constant, and that cy
t and co
t each follow a
random walk, rising or falling each period in response to current
shocks to wage growth and the capital return.  There is perfect
risk-sharing both across the old and young alive at the same time
and across different periods.
       Turning to the implementation of the Rawlsian equilibrium,
we find that the spirit of our earlier results continues to hold.
The only qualification to Propositions 1-3 concerns the behavior of
taxation.  Consider Proposition 2, which describes a fully-funded29
trust fund that holds equity claims to capital.  Once again, the
social security benefit equals consumption when old in the Rawlsian
equilibrium.  Yet, because agents now consume when young, taxes on
the young are no longer 100 percent.  Instead, taxes are set such
that the after-tax wage equals consumption when young in the
Rawlsian equilibrium.  
     In this system, the key parameters are again adjusted in the
spirit of the permanent income hypothesis, in the sense that shocks
affect the system's resources, leading to permanent changes in
benefits and taxes.  A good shock to the capital return raises
benefits and reduces taxes.  A good shock to wage growth raises
both benefits and taxes.  (This last result ensures that some of
the windfall to the young is taxed away to be shared with the
current old).  The system's parameters are always adjusted in a way
that maintains a fixed ratio of the benefit to the after-tax wage.




This paper has explored an approach to analyzing
intergenerational risk sharing.  According to this approach,
policymakers designing institutions that share generational risk
should attempt to achieve the allocation that the various
generations would reach on their own if they could have traded in30
complete contingent-claims markets.  That is, policy should achieve
what the invisible hand would if it could.
This approach can be used not only for deriving the optimal
allocation of consumption but also as a guide for the design of a
social security system.  An obvious but important result from our
analysis is the suboptimality of private retirement accounts--a
possible social security reform that has received much attention in
recent years. Private retirements accounts merely replicate the
equilibrium without any intergenerational risk sharing.  That is,
private retirement accounts leave all generations facing more risk
than they should.
Another robust conclusion from our analysis is that the
government should spread capital risk among generations in a way
that appears absent from current policy.  If equity claims to
capital are held privately, as they are now, then optimal
intergenerational risk sharing requires that social security
benefits be negatively indexed to the capital return: social
security benefits should be cut when the stock market is doing
well. In the absence of such negative indexation, the government
should invest the social security trust fund directly in capital.
Negative indexation and government ownership of capital seem to be
the only mechanisms that allow current capital risk to be shared
optimally with future generations.
     Several recent proposals for social security reform have, in31
fact, included such provisions.  The Clinton administration, for
instance, proposed investing the social security trust fund in
equities, as envisioned in our Proposition 2.  The negative
indexation of benefits to equity returns may seem less likely, but
in fact it is part of the Feldstein proposal for social security
reform (see, for example, Feldstein and Samwick, 1999, and
Feldstein and Ranguelova, 2001).  In this plan, individuals would
have private accounts invested in capital markets; the more they
earn in these accounts, however, the less they would receive in
supplemental benefits.  This "clawback" provision, as it is often
called, resembles the negative indexation envisioned in our
Propostion 3.  Either approach could implement the Rawlsian
equilibrium, raising the expected welfare of all generations.  In
theory, intergenerational risk sharing offers the prospect of a
free lunch.
     Admittedly, given economists' limited understanding of these
issues, it may be too early to jump to policy conclusions.  Even
with the extensions in Section VII, the model in this paper makes
many strong assumptions: individuals within a generation are
homogeneous, wages and capital returns are exogenous, all
generations are the same size, and so on.  Addressing real-world
issues of social security reform will require relaxing these
assumptions.  Fortunately, the concept of a Rawlsian equilibrium--
the equilibrium in an overlapping-generations model with complete32
contingent-claims markets--is quite general.  Future work could
investigate the nature of the Rawlsian equilibrium and the
institutions that can implement it in a richer variety of settings.33
APPENDIX
     This Appendix presents details of our analysis that are
omitted from the text.
     Equilibrium Prices with a Single Capital-Return Shock
     Here we derive the Rawlsian equilibrium when there is a single
capital-return shock in period j.  We do this by deriving two
necessary conditions for the equilibrium, equations (2) and (3).
     Equation (2) states that, for tj, the relative price of
consumption at t and t+1 in the same history must equal the gross
interest rate .  To see why this condition must hold, suppose
first that Pti/P(t+1)i<.  In this case, an agent born at t can buy a
unit of good ti, save it to acquire  units of good (t+1)i, sell
enough of good (t+1)i to pay for his purchase of good ti, and still
have some left over.  This arbitrage possibility would create an
infinitely large demand for good ti, which could not be satisfied
by the finite suply.
     Now suppose that Pti/P(t+1)i>.  In this case, no agent born at
t will save, because he can obtain a higher return by selling his
endowment of good ti and buying good (t+1)i.  Thus the capital
stock is zero in period t.  This cannot be an equilibrium, because
no capital in period t means there are not enough resources from
t+1 onward to make every generation as well off as in the Hobbesian
equilibrium.  If some generation is worse off than in the Hobbesian
equilibrium, the allocation cannot be the Rawlsian equilibrium,     1 If the capital stock is zero in period t, the economy's resources from t+1
on are given by the certain wage of one at t+1, t+2,....  In the Hobbesian
equilibrium, consumption is >1 at t+1, t+2, .... Thus there are not enough
resources to give each generation its consumption level in the Hobbesian
equilibrium with certainty.  And one can show that randomization would only make
matters worse, because it would create uncertainty about consumption without
raising its average level.
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because agents have the option of avoiding the markets and
receiving their Hobbesian consumption levels.1 
     Now consider equation (3), which gives the relative price of
consumption in the good and bad histories.  This equation follows
from two underlying conditions. The first is a first order
condition for utility maximization: the relative price Q must equal
the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption in the good and bad
histories.  With log utility, the ratio of marginal utilities is
the inverse of the ratio of consumption levels.  Thus Q = ctG/ctB for
th .
     The other condition underlying (3) is that, in each possible
history, the present value of total consumption beginning in period
j must equal the present value of resources beginning at j, given
the gross interest rate  that holds from j+1 on.  The present
value of resources is the gross return on capital at j plus the
present value of wages at j, j+1, ... If the present value of
consumption were greater than the present value of resources, the
allocation would not be feasible.  If the present value of
resources were larger than the present value of consumption, the
allocation would be inefficient, and hence could not be a Walrasian35
equilibrium.
     In the good history, the gross capital return in period j is
+xj and the wages at j, j+1, ... are 1, 1, ...  The  present value
of these resources is  + xj + /(-1).  In the bad history, the
wages are the same but the capital return at j is -xj; the present
value of resources is  - xj + /(-1).  The ratio of these two
present values must equal the ratio of the present values of
consumption in the two histories.  Recall that the ratio of
consumption in the two histories is Q in each period; this implies
that the ratio of present values of consumption is Q.  Setting Q
equal to the ratio of present values of resources yields equation
(3).    
     Equilibrium Consumption Levels with a Single Capital-Return
Shock
     Given the relative prices in equations (2)-(3), one can derive
equilibrium consumption levels from agents' utility-maximization
problems.  A generation born in period tj has an endowment of one
unit of good tG and one unit of good tB, because his wage is one in
both histories.  If we treat good tG as the numeraire, the value of
an agent's endowment at t is (1+Q).  The agent wishes to consume in
period t+1 in each history.  Given the relative prices in (2) and
(3), the agent's budget constraint is
   (A1)     c(t+1)G + Qc(t+1)B = (1+Q).
Maximizing the average of utility, log(Ct+1), over the two histories36
subject to (A1) yields the solutions for c(t+1)G and c(t+1)B in equation
(5).
     The generation born at j-1 and old in period j receives a unit
of good j-1 (this is not indexed by G or B because the shock has
not yet occurred).  By saving, he can transform his unit of good j-
1 into +xj units of good jG and -xj units of good jB.  He wishes
to consume goods jG and jB, and faces the budget constraint
     (A2)    cjG + QcjB =  + xj + Q(-xj) .
Maximizing expected utility subject to (A2) yields the consumption
levels in (4).   
     The Case of Many Small Shocks
     Equation (6) gives a first order approximation in xj of
equations (4) and (5), the equilibrium consumption levels in the
example of a single capital-return shock.  To see how (6) is
derived, consider ctG for tj+1.  Evaluating the expression in (5)
at xj=0 yields ctG=, since Q=1 when xj=0.  Differentiating with
respect to xj yields
   (A3)     dctG/dxj = (/2)(dQ/dxj) .
Taking the derivative of Q (equation (3)) and evaluating it at xj=0
yields 
   (A4)     dQ/dxjxj=0  =  2(-1)/2 .
Substituting (A4) into (A3) yields 
   (A5)     dctG/dxjxj=0  =  (-1)/ .
This result leads to the approximate solution for ctG in (6).  The37
results for ctB and for consumption at t=j are obtained similarly.
     Our use of first-order approximations makes it easy to go from
one shock to the general case of xt>0 for all t.  In the general
case, we are interested in deriving 
     cth(x1,...,xt)
for all periods t and all histories h through t.  A first-order
approximation in x1,...,xt yields
   (A6)     cth    cth(0,...,0) + t
s=1cth/xs(0,...,0)xs .         
     In this expression, the first term on the right is , the
equilibrium consumption level when there are no shocks.  Within the
sum, a term cth/xs(0,...,0) can be determined as follows.  Consider
cth(0,...,0,xs,0,...,0), i.e. cth as a function of xs when all other
x's are zero.  Differentiating this function with respect to xs and
evaluating it at xs=0 yields cth/xs(0,...,0).  But
cth(0,...,0,xs,0,...,0) is just the solution for conditional
consumption in period t when there is a single capital-return shock
at s.  This solution is given in equations (4) and (5).  In
deriving (6), we used the results that the derivatives of (4) and
(5) evaluated at xs=0 are (-1)/ when the capital-return shock at
s is good and -(-1)/ when the shock is bad.  These results imply
cth/xs(0,...,0)=s(-1)/.  Substituting this result into (A6)
yields equation (7), the approximate solution for consumption in
the general case.
     The Rawlsian Equilibrium in the General Case38
     Here we provide approximate solutions for consumption in the
Rawlsian equilibrium when agents consume in both periods of life
and both wage growth and the capital return are uncertain.  We
assume constant levels of uncertainty: xt=x and zt=z in all periods.
The results are generalizations of equations (8) and (10) and are
derived in the same way as those equations:
   (A7)     ci










               K=(1-)(-)/[2-(-)],  K'=1/(-+) ,
where ci
t for i=y,o are consumption of the young and the old and ci
t*
is consumption in the certainty case of Rt= and Ht= for all t
(cy
t*=t and co
t*=(1-)t).  As discussed in the text, the ratio of
cy
t to co
t is a constant equal to cy
t*/co
t* = /[(1-)].  Both cy
t and
co
t follow random walks in response to shocks to H and R.39
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